

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 01 OF 09 011151Z

12

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04 L-01

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

ISO-00 /074 W

----- 071746

P R 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0559

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM USREP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON OCT 29, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0360

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION
WITH EASTERN REPS ON OCTOBER 29, 1974. PARAGRAPHS
1 THROUGH 7 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

8. KLEIN AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THAT
IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN THE LAST
SESSION ABOUT THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMA-
MENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, HE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE THE
SENSE AND SCOPE OF THIS PROPOSAL. THE NEXT DAY, OCTOBER 30,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 01 OF 09 011151Z

WOULD MARK THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

HOWEVER, PARTICIPANTS HAD AS YET NOT SUCCEEDED IN MAKING ANY PROGRESS IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE REMAINED DIFFERENT AND THE GAP BETWEEN THESE TWO POSITIONS WAS A WIDE ONE. BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION AT THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS AND HAD STATED THEIR DESIRE TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROGRESS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

9. KLEIN CONTINUED THAT, TAKING THIS SITUATION INTO ACCOUNT, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD DECIDED TO SUBMIT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE TALKS TO MOVE FORWARD AND GIVE THEM NEW IMPETUS. IN TAKING THIS INITIATIVE, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO PRESENT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. THEY HAD THEREFORE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE WISHES AND DESIRES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. AN IMPARTIAL OBSERVER WOULD BEYOND ANY DOUBT AGREE THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A COMPROMISE. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WANTED ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. HOWEVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE STATED WISHES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, THE SOCIALIST PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED THAT THE US AND USSR START THE REDUCTIONS. THE EAST HAD ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE DESIRE OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO ENTER THE REDUCTION PROCESS UNTIL AFTER THE US AND USSR HAD IMPLEMENTED THEIR REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THE ORIGINAL SOCIALIST POSITION HAD BEEN TO ESTABLISH THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS FOR 1975 PROPORTIONATE TO THE SHARE OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE TOTAL OF ARMED FORCES ON ITS SIDE. NOW, EASTERN GOVERNMENTS WERE PROPOSING THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE FIRST INITIAL REDUCTIONS BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE US AND USSR. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD STATED THAT REDUCTIONS IN 1975 WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS ON MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE PROPOSED INITIAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE ELABORATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE BASIC POSITIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND WOULD NOT CREATE A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS OR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 01 OF 09 011151Z

10. KLEIN CONTINUED THAT THIS BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTENT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD IN FACT TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE POINTS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD SUBMITTED A SERIOUS PROPOSAL REPRESENTING A GENUINE COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. THEY HAD IN THIS WAY

PROVED THEIR DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD. AT THE MOST RECENT INFORMAL SESSION, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, WHILE RECOGNIZING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WERE POSITIVE, HAD TRIED HARD TO CRITICIZE THAT PROPOSAL IN EVERY CONCEIVABLE WAY. THIS CRITICISM WAS NOT OBJECTIVE NOR DID IT INDICATE A DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD. EASTERN REPS WOULD RETURN AT A LATER POINT IN THE PRESENT SESSION TO THE CONTENT OF THEIR PROPOSAL. BUT IF WESTERN REPS WERE ABLE TO APPROACH THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WITHOUT PRECONCEPTIONS, THEY WOULD FIND THE EAST HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. FOR ITS PART, HOWEVER, WEST HAD NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN POSITION. ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ONLY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL SHOULD SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN CRITICISM WAS THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD NOT FULLY COMPLY WITH THE WESTERN POSITION. A POSITION OF THIS KIND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FLEXABILITY OR THE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS APPEALED TO WEST TO RECOGNIZE THE OBJECTIVE MERITS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AND TO SPARE NO EFFORTS TO COME TO A FIRST REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

11. UK REP SAID ALLIED REPS CONSIDERED IT UNNECESSARY FOR PARTICIPANTS TO COMPETE IN ASSERTIONS OF INTEREST IN PROGRESS. EASTERN REPS WERE FULLY AWARE THAT ALLIES WERE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN MAKING PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ON THE EVE OF THEIR FIRST ANNIVERSARY. BOTH SIDES STILL HAD A DIFFERENT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 02 OF 09 011203Z

11
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /074 W
----- 071916

P 010930Z NOV 74
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0560
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

APPROACH. BUT BOTH WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN FINDING A WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS. HE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT WHEN PARTICIPANTS CRITICIZED OR RAISED OBJECTIONS ON EITHER SIDE, THIS ACTION WOULD NOT LEAD TO DOUBTS AS TO THE GENUINENESS OF THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES IN MAING PROGRESS. IN THE LAST SESSION AND AGAIN IN THE PRESENT ONE, EASTERN REPS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT THE LACK OF OBJECTIVITY ON THE PART OF WESTERN REPS IN THE ASSESSMENT BY WESTERN REPS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. HE WOULD REQUEST EASTERN REPS TO BELIVE THAT ALLIED CRITICISMS WERE MADE IN AN OBJECTIVE SPIRIT AND IN A GENUINE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE TALKS.

12. UK REP SAID THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE FURTHER POINT. ONE REASON PARTICIPANTS WERE ABLE TO CONDUCT THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS IN A FREE AND FRANK WAY WAS THAT THEY FELT ASSURED THAT THE RULE OF CONFIDENTIALITY WOULD APPLY TO WHATEVER WAS SAID IN THESE MEETINGS. ALLIED REPS FOR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 02 OF 09 011203Z

THEIR PART ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS. THEY HAD THEREFORE BEEN SOMEWHAT SURPRISED TO OBSERVE THAT WHAT EAST WAS DESCRIBING AS A MAJOR NEW PROPOSAL HAD DURING THE LAST WEEK BEEN LEAKED TO THE PRESS IN SOME DETAIL. ALLIED REPS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BASIS OF THESE SESSIONS. THEY WERE SORRY IT HAPPENED. THEY DID KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THE LEAK HAD TAKEN PLACE FROM EASTERN SOURCES AND THOUGHT IT A PITY THAT IT HAD TAKEN PLACE AT THIS STAGE IN THE DISCUSSIONS.

13. UK REP SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR PRESENT PROPOSAL WAS CONCERNED, THE PROPOSAL THE EAST WAS MAKING NOW WAS THE SAME IN SUBSTANCE AS THE EASTERN "FIRST STEP" PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE. LAST JUNE, THE EAST HAD PRESENTED THEIR PROPOSAL AS AN INFORMAL SUGGESTION. NOW, THEY WERE PRESENTING IT AS A FORMAL PROPOSAL. DESPITE THIS DISTINCTION, HOWEVER, THE TWO PROPOSALS WERE THE SAME IN SUBSTANCE. THIS COULD BE DEMONSTRATED BY COMPARING THE TWO.

14. UK REP SAID THAT, FIRST, THE EASTERN SIDE HAD SAID LAST JUNE THAT AN INITIAL STEP OF REDUCTIONS WITH 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE SHOULD BE MADE, WITH ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKING PART IN REDUCTIONS. SECOND, THE EAST HAD INDICATED THAT A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT SHOULD FIX THE AMOUNT TO BE REDUCED BY EACH PARTICIPANT. THIRD, THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US AND USSR, AND POSSIBLY SOME OTHER PARTICIPANTS, TO IMPLEMENT THEIR REDUCTIONS FIRST, KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT, BEFORE THE END OF 1975, ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IMPLEMENT REDUCTIONS OF THE AGREED SCOPE. IN ITS PRESENT PROPOSAL, EAST HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THIS FIRST STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES. FOURTH, IN THE JUNE VERSION THE EAST HAD INDICATED THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD TAKE THE MAJOR PROPORTION OF THE FIRST STEP REDUCTIONS. FIFTH, THE EAST ALSO HAD INDICATED THAT GROUND, AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD ALL BE COVERED. AND FINALLY, THE EASTERN SIDE HAD SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON MORE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 02 OF 09 011203Z

SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION MEASURES WOULD CONTINUE, AND THAT A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT WOULD SPECIFY THIS. THE EAST'S POSITION HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN REPS WERE THINKING OF TWO SUCCESSIVE AGREEMENTS.

15. UK REP SAID THE WEST CONSIDERED THAT, IN TWO IMPORTANT RESPECTS, BOTH THE EAST'S JUNE SUGGESTIONS AND THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS WERE RETROGRADE IN COMPARISON WITH WHAT EASTERN REPS HAD SAID IN MARCH. IN MARCH, THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO ALLOCATE ITS OWN REDUCTION TOTAL AMONG ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON ITS SIDE. EASTERN REPS ALSO HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A GLOBAL CEILING ON THE NEW FORCE LEVEL ON EACH SIDE, THAT IS, A CEILING ON THE NEW OVERALL TOTAL OF FORCES ON EACH SIDE. HOWEVER, THESE TWO POINTS DID NOT APPEAR IN THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL. UK REP CONCLUDED THAT ALL OF THE OTHER POINTS HE HAD MENTIONED WERE CONTAINED IN THE EAST'S PRESENT INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES HAD CLEARLY EXPLAINED AT THE TIME WHY THEY WERE OPPOSED TO MOST OF THEM. THUS, THE WEST SAW NO CHANGES OF SUBSTANCE IN THE EAST'S POSITION SINCE LAST JUNE.

16. UK REP SAID THAT FINALLY HE WOULD LIKE TO REMIND EASTERN REPS THAT, AS THEY WERE AWARE, ALLIES WERE AWAITING EASTERN COMMENTS ON THE SUGGESTION THEY HAD

MADE DURING THE OCTOBER 15 INFORMAL SESSION FOR DEALING WITH INCONSISTENCIES THE EAST HAD POINTED OUT IN THE ORGANIZATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA. ALLIES REALIZED THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS A COMPLEX ONE. THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO PROVIDE FURTHER COMMENT OR CLARIFICATION OR TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, BUT THEY HOPED EAST WOULD BE ADVANCING THEIR COMMENTS ON THIS TOPIC DURING THE PRESENT SESSION.

17. POLISH REP SAID THAT AS FAR AS UK REP'S REMARKS EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT SUPPOSED PRESS LEAKS, HE SUGGESTED THIS POINT BE DEALT WITH LATER SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE FLOW OF DISCUSSION. AS REGARDS UK REP'S FINAL REMARKS, IT WAS THE EASTERN INTENTION TO SAY SOMETHING ON THIS SUBJECT DURING THIS SESSION. BUT FIRST, HE WISHED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00369 02 OF 09 011203Z

TO ADDRESS UK REP'S COMMENTS ON THE EASTERN INITIAL
LLA
PROPOSAL.

18. POLISH REP CONTICIED THAT, HAVING ANALYZED THE POINTS ALLIED REPS HAD RAISED AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, WHICH THE UK REP HAD JUST EMPHASIZED, IT STILL APPEARED TO EASTERN REPS THAT THE WESTERN CRITICISM WAS OVERLOOKING, WHETHER DELIBERATELY OR NOT, THE REAL COMPROMISE SENSE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. ALLIED REPS WERE SAYING THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT NEW. THIS WAS NOT TRUE. THE ONLY

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 03 OF 09 011218Z

12
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /074 W

----- 072151

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0561
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITO
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

VALID COMPARISON WAS WITH THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8. SINCE THE, NO CONCRETE NEW PROPOSAL HAD BEEN ADVANCED. BUT THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS NEW. PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS A COMPROMISE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WHICH TOOK THE WESTERN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT. ALLIED REPS HAD PROPOSED THAT ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND THAT A CONSIDERABLE TIME SHOULD ELAPSE BEFORE OTHERS FOLLOWED. ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO PRESS THIS POSITION. HOWEVER, EASTERN REPS HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. NONETHELESS, TO MEET WESTERN INTERESTS EAST HAD INCLUDED IN THEIR OWN PROPOSAL A PROVISION THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD REDUCE FIRST IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1975 AND THAT THE OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 03 OF 09 011218Z

19. POLISH REP SAID ANOTHER POINT WAS THE ALLOCATION OF REDUCTIONS TO THE US AND USSR RESPECTIVELY. THIS POINT TOO HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN DEFERENCE TO THE WESTERN POSITION. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ALSO PROVIDED FOR REDUCTIONS BY THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BUT THIS WAS HOW COMPROMISES WERE MADE. ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT FROM THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION THAT THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE AND THE OTHERS IN THE SECOND PHASE. ALLIED REPS HAD CRITICIZED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT A REDUCTION OF 10,000 EACH BY THE US AND USSR WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD NOT HEARD WHAT RANGE OF REDUCTIONS ALLIED REPS THEMSELVES WOULD PROPOSE. THUS, THIS CRITICISM WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVE.

19. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD EXPRESSED

CONCERN ABOUT THE FOLLOW-UP. THIS WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. EASTERN REPS INTENDED TO HAVE A CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND THEY IMMEDIATELY ON REACHING AGREEMENT INTENDED TO ENTER ON THESE NEW NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED. THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT DEMONSTRATED EASTERN INTEREST IN MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, AND ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD INDICATED THEIR READINESS TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THESE DIMENSIONS. THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL DEMONSTRATED THE EASTERN DESIRE TO START THE REDUCTION PROCESS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. THE FACT THAT REDUCTIONS WERE SMALLER MADE IT EASIER TO CARRY OUT AND WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO START REDUCTIONS IN 1975. IT WAS TRUE THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIAL. BUT THEY WOULD REPRESENT STARTING CONDITIONS FOR SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIAL. ALLIED REPS HAD ALSO CRITICIZED EASTERN PROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR A GOAL FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS TRUE. BUT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AS REGARDED THE FINAL GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. THE EAST CONSIDERED THAT THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND SECURITY. BUT ALLIED REPS EQUATED THESE AIMS WITH ACHIEVING A COMMON CEILING. EASTERN REPS IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 03 OF 09 011218Z

TURN CONSIDERED THIS ALLIED GOAL AS INEQUITABLE AND NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES. THIS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WAS OF SUCH MAGNITUDE THAT IT COULD NOT BE EASILY RESOLVED. IN ORDER TO COPE WITH IT BETTER, EASTERN REPS HAD SUGGESTED AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD COMPLY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

20. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD RAISED THE PROBLEM OF CEILINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL. UK REP HAD JUST REFERRED TO THE ISSUE OF GLOBAL CEILINGS AND OTHER WESTERN REPS HAD MENTIONED THEIR OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL CEILINGS. EASTERN REPS HAD ABUNDANTLY EXPLAINED THEIR REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO THE COMMON CEILING. THIS WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON A DISTORTED ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, DELIBERATELY SINGLING OUT ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THAT SITUATION AND IGNORING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. AS TO THE ISSUE OF GLOBAL OR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS FOR A WHOLE ALLIANCE, THIS IDEA WAS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE MEMBERS OF TWO ALLIANCES. BUT THEY WERE PARTICIPATING IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS AS INDIVIDUAL AND

SEPARATE SOVEREIGN STATES AND, AS SUCH, THEY WOULD UNDER-TAKE OBLIGATIONS. FURTHERMORE, AGREEMENTS WOULD BE CONCLUDED AMONG SOVEREIGN STATES, NOT BETWEEN ALLIANCES. ALLIED REPS KNEW WELL THAT THE EAST HAD OPPOSED A BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS WERE SURPRISED THAT THEIR POSITION ON NATIONAL CEILINGS HAD BEEN SO CRITICIZED BY ALLIED REPS. IT WAS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THE INTENTION OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND NOT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEM. EAST HAD NOT HEARD THAT ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANT INTENDED TO INCREASE ITS FORCES AT THIS TIME. IF NONE INTENDED TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES, WHY SHOULD THERE BE OBJECTIONS TO ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON THE FORCES OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRY? IF A STATE WOULD UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS TO DECREASE ITS FORCES, AT THE SAME TIME RESERVING ITS FREEDOM TO INCREASE ITS FORCES AT SOME LATER TIME OF ITS CHOOSING, SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE. MOREOVER, EASTERN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00369 03 OF 09 011218Z

REPS HAD FREQUENTLY STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT AT ALL A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE TO THEM WHAT FORCES PARTICULAR COUNTRIES IN THE AREA HAD FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS. IT WAS MANIFEST FROM THE WESTERN POSITION THAT THE WEST TOO WAS NOT INDIFFERENT ON THIS POINT. ANOTHER POINT: OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN MUST BE CLEAR AND CONCISE. ANY OTHER APPROACH WOULD NOT DO JUSTICE TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AVOID PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AMBIGUITY OR SUSPICION AS TO THE INTENTIONS OF PARTICULAR COUNTRIES.

21. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE WISHED TO COMMENT ON THE POLISH REP'S REMARKS THAT THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, RATHER THAN WITH EASTERN IDEAS WHICH HAD BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY ADVANCED. HE WAS A NEWCOMER TO THESE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. BUT HE DID HAVE THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 04 OF 09 011231Z

11

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /074 W

----- 072303

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0562

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

AIM OF THESE SESSIONS WAS SERIOUS DISCUSSION AND THE CONSIDERATION OF SERIOUS VIEWPOINTS AND THAT IF VIEWS AND IDEAS WERE BROUGHT FORWARD BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE OTHER SIDE WHETHER THEY WERE CALLED PROPOSALS OR NOT. IT WAS ALSO HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WHEN ONE SIDE INTRODUCED IDEAS, THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD CONSIDER THAT THEY WERE SERIOUSLY INTENDED AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PROGRESS AND WOULD NOT MERELY BE DISCREDITED AT A LATER STAGE.

22. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE EAST'S JUNE PROPOSAL, THE CURRENT EASTERN PROPOSAL DID CONTAIN TWO ELEMENTS NOT PRESENT IN THE FIRST STAGE OF THE DRAFT TREATY THE EAST HAD PRESENTED LAST NOVEMBER 8. THESE TWO ELEMENTS WERE POSITIVE, AND DID REPRESENT LIMITED MOVEMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FROM THE EAST'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF LAST NOVEMBER. THE EASTERN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 04 OF 09 011231Z

PROPOSAL DID DIFFERENTIATE TO A LIMITED DEGREE BETWEEN THE US AND USSR AND THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IT DID THIS WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS AND ALSO AS REGARDS THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED. THIS DIFFERENCE WAS SLIGHTLY MORE EXPLICIT THAN IN THE EAST'S JUNE PROPOSAL. THIS WAS A MODEST STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, THOUGH IT DID NOT GO FAR

ENOUGH. THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE EAST ENVISAGED TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED IN SEQUENCE. THIS, TOO, WAS A POSITIVE ELEMENT, THOUGH THE TWO SIDES CONTINUED TO DIFFER AS TO THE CONTENT OF THESE PHASES. THIS POINT TOO HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE EAST'S MARCH AND JUNE SUGGESTIONS.

23. THE NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, HOWEVER, IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS IDENTICAL TO THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EAST'S NOVEMBER 8 DRAFT. AS REGARDS THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS, THE FIRST STAGE OF THE NOVEMBER 8 DRAFT ENVISAGED A 20,000 MAN REDUCTION FOR EACH SIDE. SO DID THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL. AS REGARDS THE SHPE OF REDUCTIONS, THE NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL HAD ENVISAGED SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. SO DID THE PRESENT PROPOSAL. THE EAST'S NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL HAD COVERED ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. SO DID THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL. FROM THE OUTSET OF THESE TALKS ALLIED REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST JUST WHY THIS APPROACH WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THE WESTERN REPS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW A PROPOSAL OF WHICH THIS APPROACH FORMED THE CENTRAL ELEMENT COULD BE PRESENTED AS NEW AND AS COMPROMISE DESIGNED TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD.

24. NETHERLANDS REP SAID IT WAS ALSO THE CASE THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE PRESENT EASTERN POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS THE EAST'S ORIGINAL POSITION. IT HAD BEEN THE EAST'S POSITION RIGHT FROM THE START OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE AND SHOULD ALSO COMMIT THEMSELVES AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS COULD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 04 OF 09 011231Z

TAKE PLACE. THAT WAS STILL THE EAST'S POSITION. THE ORIGINAL ALLIED POSITION WAS THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES UNTIL AFTER THE US AND USSR HAD REDUCED THEIR FORCES.

25. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THE WESTERN REPS HAD EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR THIS POSITION, AND THESE REASONS REMAINED VALID. THE ALLIES WOULD STILL PREFER TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES OF THEIR ORIGINAL APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WEST HAD DECIDED TO TAKE THE EAST'S CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT AND MOVE TO THE MIDDLE GROUND. THE ALLIES HAD TOLD THE EASTERN REPS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF

A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, ALL THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG, WERE NOW WILLING -- BEFORE THE US AND USSR HAD IMPLEMENTED THEIR REDUCTIONS -- TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN A SECOND PHASE. BUT THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AS TO THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF SUCH REDUCTIONS. SUCH COMMITMENTS WOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE SECOND PHASE. THUS, THE ALLIES HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION AND MOVED TO THE MIDDLE GROUND. THE EAST, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO ITS ORIGINAL POSITION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS AS TO THE SPECIFIC AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS TOOK PLACE.

26. NETHERLANDS REP SAID IN SUMMARY THAT, IN FACT, NEARLY THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD BEEN CONTAINED IN THE NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL AND HAD BEEN INTENSIVELY DISCUSSED FOR NEARLY A YEAR. GIVEN THIS FACT, THE WEST COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE EAST THOUGH THE ALLIES WOULD CONSIDER THE PRESENT PROPOSAL EITHER A DIFFERENT OR A MORE ACCEPTABLE PROPOSAL. ASIDE FROM THE SUBSTANCE, THE EASTERN SIDE HAD ALSO MADE THE CLAIM THAT, LEAVING CONTENT TO ONE SIDE,

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 05 OF 09 011243Z

46

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01

INR-05 IO-04 L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-05 /074 W

----- 072422

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0563

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

THE EAST'S PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN REPS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS ASSERTION. WHAT WAS NEW ABOUT THE METHOD THE EAST WAS PROPOSING? WHAT WERE THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DISTINGUISHED IT FROM OTHER PROCEDURAL APPROACHES AS A WAY OF MOVING AHEAD?

27. KHESTOV SAID THAT HE AGREED FULLY WITH UK REP'S REMARK THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD USE OBJECTIVE CRITICISM IN DISCUSSING THE POSITION OF OTHERS. ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PROCEED FROM OBJECTIVE POSITIONS IN EVALUATING THE POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE. MOREOVER, THIS CRITICISM SHOULD NOT ONLY BE OBJECTIVE, IT SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE, DESIGNED TO SEEK SOLUTION TO QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION. VIEWING THE RECENT EASTERN PROPOSAL FROM THIS VIEWPOINT, EASTERN REPS HAD ON PRESENT OCCASION ATTEMPTED TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE CRITICISMS ADVANCED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 05 OF 09 011243Z

BY WESTERN REPS OF THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL. WESTERN REPS HAD ADVANCED 10 OR 11 ARGUMENTS CRITICIZING THIS PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS COULD NOT ANALYZE ALL OF THESE CRITICISMS IN THE PRESENT SESSION. BUT NONETHELESS HE WISHED TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THEM IN ORDER TO TRY TO SHOW WHETHER THEY WERE SERIOUS AND OBJECTIVE. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS USED IN THIS DISCUSSION WOULD AT LEAST CREATE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING FOR ALL AS TO WHERE A WAY OUT MIGHT BE.

28. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, NETHERLANDS REP HAD ASKED ABOUT WHETHER THE EASTERN POSITION WAS A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND, IF SO, WHAT DID EAST HAVE IN MIND. EAST DID NOT HAVE IN MIND ANY NEW DISCOVERIES AS REGARDED THEIR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATING. IT WAS SIMPLY THAT OVER THE PAST MONTH, WESTERN REPS HAD ONCE MORE PROPOSED SETTling THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SO-CALLED WESTERN MODIFICATIONS OF THEIR ORIGINAL OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET DEMONSTRATED THAT THE WEST WAS STILL ADHERING TO ITS ORIGINAL POSITION ON THIS QUESTION. EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THE WESTERN REPLY

TO THIS QUESTION WAS THE ONE GIVEN FROM THE OUTSET, THAT IS, ONLY TWO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE, THE US AND USSR. EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD ADVANCED CONVINCING ARGUMENTS TO DEMONSTRATE WHY THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH IN DEALING WITH THE REDUCTION PLAN EXTENDING OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THIS WAS WHY THEY PROPOSED TO SEEK SOME INITIAL REDUCTION STEPS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT BY DOING SO, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWPOINTS OF BOTH SIDES.

29. KHESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE THAT WEST CONTINUED TO HAVE ITS OWN COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTION PROGRAM, AS DID THE EAST. THE ADVANTAGE OF THE INITIAL REDUCTION PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT ENABLED ALL PARTICIPANTS TO SEEK MUTUAL CONCESSIONS AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACHES AND TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF EACH SIDE. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THEY HAD PROPOSED SOMETHING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 05 OF 09 011243Z

WHICH WOULD ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE BOTH THE WESTERN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT WHERE THIS WAS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS THEIR OWN. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY STATED HOW THEY HAD TRIED TO TAKE WESTERN CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.

30. KHESTOV SAID THAT AS REGARDS NETHERLANDS REP'S REMARKS THAT EAST WAS NOW FINALLY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE SIDE AND THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER, EAST SAW NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD DIVIDE PARTICIPANTS INTO CATEGORIES FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. EASTERN REPS HAD EMPHASIZED WHY THIS WAS SO. EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE BOTH NATIONAL AND FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, BUT THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY. EASTERN REPS STILL BELIEVED THIS. ARGUMENTS BY WESTERN REPS HAD NOT CHANGED THE BASIC EASTERN VIEWPOINT ON THIS TOPIC. NONETHELESS, IN AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP AGREEMENT, EASTERN REPS HAD TRIED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN VIEWPOINT. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED THAT THE US AND USSR COULD START REDUCTIONS FIRST. OTHERS WOULD BE LATER. THEY WOULD IN PRACTICE FORM A SECOND CATEGORY FOR ANXNITIAL REDUCTION STEP ONLY. THIS WAS ONE WAY EAST HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN POSITION.

31. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT ANOTHER ISSUE RAISED BY THE WEST WAS WHO SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO REDUCE. AS WESTERN REPS KNEW, THE EASTERN REPS BELIEVED ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD START THEIR REDUCTIONS TOGETHER. EAST HAD EVERY REASON TO ADHERE TO THIS VIEW. BUT FOR THE

PURPOSES OF AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP, THEY HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN VIEW. FOR THIS SPECIFIC PURPOSE ONLY, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS THAT ONLY TWO STATES SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS FROM THE BEGINNING AND THIS WAS IN FACT THE WESTERN REPLY TO THIS QUESTION. SO, ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS, EAST HAD TAKEN WESTERN VIEWPOINTS INTO CONSIDERATION. ON SOME OTHER ISSUES, EAST HAD NOT DONE SO AND HAD NOT INCLUDED THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT IN THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. THIS WAS BECAUSE EAST BELIEVED THAT, IN THESE CASES, IT HAD STRONGER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00369 05 OF 09 011243Z

ARGUMENTS TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS POSITION. ONE EXAMPLE WAS COVERAGE OF ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, DURING THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, NO PARTICIPANT HAD DENIED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO CARRY OUT REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS, THE ONLY AGREED EXCLUSION WAS NAVAL FORCES. THIS HAD BEEN THE SOLE EXCEPTION. THIS WAS WHY EAST CONSIDERED THAT ALL OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE COVERED.

32. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, ON A FURTHER POINT, THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL INDICATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE CONDUCTED IN TWO STAGES. THIS WAS AN IDEA THAT THE WEST HAD BEEN ADVOCATING ALL ALONG. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THESE REMARKS THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT SOME WESTERN VIEWS. THEREFORE, IT WOULD NOT BE AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL TO ASSERT THAT IT DID NOT DIFFER IN ANY RESPECT FROM THE EASTERN POSITION OF NOVEMBER 8. NOR WOULD IT BE OBJECTIVE TO ATTEMPT TO PROVE THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE PRESENT EASTERN

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 06 OF 09 011254Z

42
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

ACDE-00 /074 W

----- 072523

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0564

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

PROPOSAL IN COMPARISON WITH WHAT HAD BEEN SAID PREVIOUSLY IN THESE SESSIONS. IT WAS INCORRECT TO CLAIM THAT NEW IDEAS SHOULD NOT BE PRESENTED IN A FORMAL WAY IN THESE MEETINGS. ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE NEW CONSIDERATIONS AND IDEAS WERE JUST A NORMAL WAY OF CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOULD BY DEFINITION BE WELCOME. SO THEREFORE, TAKEN OBJECTIVELY, THIS NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A BIG STEP FORWARD BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WHO HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN CONSIDERATIONS. THEREFORE, FRANKLY, EASTERN REPS WOULD SAY THAT WESTERN CRITICISMS WERE DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS NOTHING GOOD IN EASTERN PROPOSAL.

33. KHESTOV CONTINUED THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE UK REP HAD EVEN SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO ASPECTS IN EASTERN PROPOSAL WHICH REPRESENTED A RETROGRADE STEP FROM IDEAS HE HAD SAID EASTERN REPS HAD PUT FORWARD EARLIER. UK REP HAD INDICATED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 06 OF 09 011254Z

IMPRESSION THAT EASTERN REPS HAD AGREED OR EVEN SUGGESTED SUCH THINGS AS GIVING FREEDOM TO EACH SIDE TO ALLOCATE REDUCTIONS AMONG ITS PARTICIPANTS AND THAT EAST HAD AGREED TO WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A GLOBAL CEILING AFTER REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, IN THE COURSE OF ALL ROUNDS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD CLEARLY STATED THEIR POSITION IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS. THEY HAD SAID IT WAS THEIR BASIC AND ORIGINAL POSITION THAT AGREED REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED IN PROPORTION TO THE AMOUNT OF FORCES EACH PARTICIPANT HAD IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE EASTERN POSITION HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT AS A RESULT OF REDUCTIONS, NO DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD

HAVE THE RIGHT TO INCREASE ITS FORCES AFTER REDUCTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT. SO THIS REMARK WAS NOT AN OBJECTIVE WAY CRITICIZING PROPOSALS EACH SIDE MIGHT PUT FORWARD.

34. KHESTOV SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE EAST HAD MADE THIS NEW PROPOSAL GUIDED BY A SINCERE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. HE THEREFORE WELCOMED UK REP'S REMARKS THAT HE BELIEVED IN THE SINCERITY OF THE DESIRES OF BOTH SIDES TO MAKE PROGRESS. IT WAS THIS DESIRE WHICH HAD MOTIVATED EASTERN PROPOSAL. THEREFORE, HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR ALLIED REPS TO ASK EAST WHY THEY HAD ADVANCED THIS PROPOSAL. ALLIED REPS HAD ADMITTED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS FACE DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WEST DID NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN REDUCTION PLAN. EAST IN TURN HAD INDICATED TO ALLIES WHY IT DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WESTERN MODIFICATIONS DEMONSTRATED THAT WEST HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS WERE AWARE THAT ALLIES HAD PRESENTED THESE MODIFICATIONS IN A SINCERE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS AND HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WEST HAD MADE SOME MOVES IN THIS RESPECT. EAST RESPECTED WESTERN DESIRE TO ELABORATE AND DEVELOP THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION. BUT HE HAD EXPLAINED WHY THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT THESE MODIFICATIONS AS AN ADEQUATE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

35. KHESTOV SAID THE EAST WAS THEREFORE ACTING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE WEST WOULD SHOW THE SAME AMOUNT OF RESPECT FOR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 06 OF 09 011254Z

EASTERN EFFORTS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. EASTERN REPS REALIZED THAT WESTERN REMARKS THUS FAR SHOWED WHY THE WEST WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT EASTERN PROPOSALS. BUT EASTERN REPS HOPED WESTERN REPS WOULD NOT LIMIT THEMSELVES TO CRITICAL REMARKS BUT WOULD COME OUT WITH SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE IN VIEW OF THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE SITUATION. THESE WERE COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPLICATED SUBJECT. WHAT WAS NECESSARY WAS ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THIS WAS THE REASON THAT THE EAST, WHILE EXPLAINING WHY THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT WESTERN VIEWS, WERE TRYING TO GIVE THE WEST A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE EASTERN POSITION, BECAUSE THIS WAS THE WAY TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IT STOOD TO REASON THAT, IN THE FURTHER PROCESS OF DISCUSSION, THE WESTERN OUTLINE AND THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND COMBINED INTO SOME INITIAL REDUCTION STEP WHICH WOULD ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE FORWARD.

35. KHESTOV SAID THAT HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE UK REP HAD BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF PRESS LEAKS. THE EAST WAS OPERATING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONFIDENTIAL. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD TO OBSERVE THIS PRINCIPLE. HOWEVER, ON FREQUENT OCCASIONS EASTERN REPS HAD OBSERVED VARIOUS PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD REMIND ALLIED REPS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ON JULY 11 THERE HAD BEEN A PRESS REPORT SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE A RECESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ALTHOUGH THE EAST HAD NOT AGREED TO ANY RECESS AT THAT POINT. WESTERN OFFICIALS HAD BEEN GIVEN AS SOURCES FOR THIS REPORT. IF HIS MEMORY WERE CORRECT, REUTERS HAD ALSO REPORTED ON JULY 17 ON THE CONTENT OF EASTERN VIEWS AGAIN WITH A REFERENCE TO WESTERN SOURCES. HE WOULD NOT REFER TO THE PRESS INTERVIEW GIVEN BY HIS DISTINGUISHED FRIEND BRYAN QUARLES WHO HAD ALSO REVEALED SOME ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WERE NOT APPROPRIATE. HE JUST HAD REMINDED ALLIED REPS OF SOME PRIOR PRESS LEAKS, SO, IF ALL PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO OBSERVE THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE ASSUMED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00369 06 OF 09 011254Z

THAT ALL SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO DO SO. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS GOOD AND BUSINESSLIKE AND IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 07 OF 09 011309Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

ACDE-00 /074 W

----- 072830

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0565

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

37. US REP SAID THAT, AS UK REP HAD INDICATED AT THE OUTSET OF THE SESSION, ALLIED REPS OF COURSE WERE INTERESTED IN PROGRESS. THEY WELCOMED ANY NEW STEP WHICH WAS IN FACT A NEW STEP FORWARD. BUT FOR A NEW STEP TO BE A STEP FORWARD, IT MUST BE SOMETHING OF SUBSTANCE AND INVOLVED A CHANGE FROM THE ORIGINAL POSITION OF THE SIDE WHICH WAS ASSERTING THAT IT WAS MAKING A NEW STEP. TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER A CHANGE OF POSITION HAD TAKEN PLACE, ONE MUST COMPARE THE ALLEGEDLY NEW PROPOSALS WITH ALL POSITIONS PUT FORWARD EARLIER, AND NOT ONLY WITH THE ORIGINAL PROPOSALS OF EACH SIDE. AS NETHERLANDS REP HAD POINTED OUT POSITIONS ADVANCED BY THE PARTICIPANTS MUST ALSO INCLUDE THOSE SUGGESTIONS MADE IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS. AS UK REP HAD POINTED OUT, THE PRESENT EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT DIFFER IN SUBSTANCE FROM WHAT THE EAST HAD SAID IN THE JUNE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 07 OF 09 011309Z

INFORMAL SESSIONS. THE EASTERN REPS HAD JUST POINTED OUT THAT THEIR PROPOSAL DID NOT STATE WHAT THE OBJECTIVE OF SUBSEQUENT STEPS WOULD BE AND THAT THIS POINT HAD BEEN OMITTED BECAUSE PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON IT. BUT TO PUT ASIDE EFFORTS TO AGREE ON A MUTUAL OBJECTIVE FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD MAKE THE FIRST STEP MORE DIFFICULT RATHER THAN LESS DIFFICULT. THIS WAS BECAUSE, AS ALLIED REPS HAD TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR, A COMMITMENT BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO THE TIME AND AMOUNT OF REDUCTION REQUIRED AN UNDERSTANDING BY THEM OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REDUCTIONS AT THE TIME THEY UNDERTOOK THESE PRECISE COMMITMENTS. MOREOVER, THE VERY SHAPE OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL EVIDENCED A GOAL WHICH WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH ENHANCING STABILITY IN THE AREA.
BY SHAPE, HE MEANT THE FACT THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR SYMMETRICAL REDUCTION OF FORCES.

38. US REP CONTINUED THAT KHLESTOV HAD CORRECTLY SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT MERELY BE CRITICAL BUT ALSO BE CONSTRUCTIVE. US REP BELIEVED THAT ALLIES TRIED TO FOLLOW THAT PRECEPT. SPECIFICALLY, KHLESTOV HIMSELF HAD POINTED OUT LAST MARCH AND APRIL THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ON WHAT PARTICIPANTS MEANT WHEN THEY SPOKE GROUND FORCES. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION TWO WEEKS EARLIER, ALLIED REPS HAD MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR MODIFYING THEIR PROPOSED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES TO MEET PROBLEMS THE EAST HAD RAISED WITH RESPECT TO THE WESTERN DEFINITION. POLISH REP HAD INDICATED THAT EAST WOULD MAKE SOME COMMENTS ON THESE SUGGESTIONS IN THE PRESENT SESSION. ALLIED REPS WOULD WELCOME THESE SINCE THEY CONSIDERED THAT THEN THEIR SUGGESTIONS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND ENTAILED THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARDS BETTER AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACT, WHICH WAS A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR REACHING ANY AGREEMENT.

39. READING FROM A PREPARED STATEMENT, KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN THE INFORMAL MEETING OF OCTOBER 15 US REP HAD ADVANCED CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONSIDERING THE DEFINITION OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 07 OF 09 011309Z

GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS REMRKS HAD BEEN THAT IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IN ORDER TO LEAD TO PROGRESS. EASTERN REPS HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WHICH HAD EMERGED IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS WHEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD BROUGHT THE ATTENTION OF THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES TO THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES RESULTING FROM THEIR DIFFERING TREATMENT OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. US REP HAD CONFIRMED THAT SOME INCONSISTENCIES DID IN FACT OCCUR. HE HAD ALSO STATED THAT ELIMINATION OF THESE INCONSISTENCIES WOULD RESULT IN A SIZABLE DECLINE IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL FOR THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES GIVEN BY THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS EARLY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. EAST TOOK NOTE OF THIS STATEMENT. SINCE THESE WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE FOR THE WESTERN SIDE ITSELF TO MAKE CORRESPONDING ADJUSTMENTS IN THE GROUND FORCE TOTAL WHICH IT HAD EARLIER SUBMITTED.

40. KHLESTOV SAID, THAT IF THE EASTERN UNDERSTANDING WERE CORRECT, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS

THE GROUND FORCE DEFINITION AND MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED GROUND FORCE TOTALS ON THE BASIS OF A CERTAIN CONDITION, THAT IS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ONCE A GROUND FORCE DEFINITION WAS AGREED, THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO MOVE THROUGH EXCHANGE OF DATA TO AGREEMENT ON OVERALL MANPOWER TOTALS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS RATHER STRANGE, TO SAY THE LEAST. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE AWARE THAT THE EASTERN ATTITUDE TO THE QUESTION OF DATA ON THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE WESTERN SIDE. IT WAS EQUALLY WELL KNOWN THAT THE EASTERN SIDE WAS ALSO OF AIR FORCES AND OF UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS POSITION CORRESPONDED TO THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IN REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE. IT WAS THEREFORE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN THIS EASTERN APPROACH, IT WAS OF LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE WHETHER THESE PERSONNEL WERE TREATED AS AIR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00369 07 OF 09 011309Z

OR GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL. IN THE COURSE OF THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THEIR WESTERN COLLEAGUES ANY ISSUE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS. EASTERN REPS HAD CONFIRMED

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 08 OF 09 011316Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

ACDE-00 /074 W

----- 072910

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0566
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 8 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

THIS POINT IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY TO
DISCUSS THIS OR THAT INDIVIDUAL QUESTION AT A LATER STAGE.

41. US REP SAID THAT, IF HE HAD UNDERSTOOD HIM CORRECTLY,
KHLESTOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO DISCUSS THIS
TOPIC AT A LATER STAGE. HE WELCOMED THE THOUGHT THAT EAST DID
ANTICIPATE EVENTUAL DISCUSSION OF TYIS SUBJECT. BUT
ALLIED REPS THOUGHT THAT DEFERRING DISCUSSION OF
THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT NOR, IN
FACT, IN THE INTEREST OF THE EASTERN REPS. WESTERN POSITION THAT THE
EAST SHOULD REDUCE MORE GROUND FORCES THAN THE WEST WOULD BASED ON
THE FIGURES THAT WEST HAD GIVEN THE EAST, WHICH DEMONSTRATED THAT
THERE WAS A GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF
ALMOST 150,000 MEN. EAST HAD CONTESTED THE ACCURACY OF THOSE FIGURES

AS EASTERN REPS KNEW, THE WEST ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 08 OF 09 011316Z

ACCURACY AND AUTHORITY OF ITS FIGURES IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT
THE WEST CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON FORCE
TOTALS AS THE BASIS OF REDUCTIONS. BECAUSE OF THIS, WESTERN DATA
WERE NATURALLY UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW. THE MOST RECENT WESTERN
FIGURES SHOWED A SLIGHT INCREASE OF ABOUT THE SAME DIMENSION IN THE
TOTALS FOR BOTH NATO AND JC Y PACT GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE,
THIS REVIEW HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE SIZE OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN
THE GROUND FORCE TOTALS OF BOTH SIDES REMAINED VIRTUALLY THE SAME
AS IN THE TOTALS WEST HAD ALREADY GIVEN EAST.

42. US REP SAID WEST CONTINUED TO THINK THAT, SUBJECT TO
THESE MINOR ADJUSTMENTS, THE FIGURES WEST HAD GIVEN EAST WERE
CORRECT. BUT WEST HAD OFFERED TO EXCHANGE FIGURES IN ORDER TO
ASCERTAIN THE BASIS OF THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN
FIGURES AND WESTERN FIGURES. EAST HAD NOT YET AGREED TO DO SO.
BUT IF EAST COULD PRODUCE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT WESTERN FIGURES
WERE WRONG, THE WEST WAS WILLING TO ADJUST THEM. THE WEST HAD
IN FACT JUST SHOWN ITS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN ITS
DEFINITIONS WHEN OBJECTIVE FACTS JUSTIFIED THIS. THEREFORE,
IF THE EAST WAS CONVINCED THAT ITS FIGURES WERE CORRECT,

THE WEST BELIEVED IT WAS IN INTEREST OF THE EAST TO ENGAGE IN RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE AND COMPARISON OF FIGURES AND TO DO THIS BEFORE AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON PRINCIPLES OF REDUCTION BECAUSE TO DO SO COULD MAKE IT EASIER TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON THOSE PRINCIPLES.

43. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT WHAT HE HAD JUST STATED WAS THE EASTERN COMMENT ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND HIS STATEMENT SHOULD BE REGARDED IN THAT LIGHT. THE EAST HAD PUT FORWARD SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS STATEMENT. TO MAKE MATTERS CLEARER, HE WOULD COMMENT ON A NUMBER OF THEM. ALLIED REPS WOULD OF COURSE RECOLLECT THAT, IN THE LAST ROUND, WHEN ALLIES HAD ADVANCED THEIR DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, EASTERN REPS HAD COMMENTED THAT THE WESTERN DEFINITION GAVE RISE TO SOME DOUBTS. IT FOLLOWED FROM THE US REP'S PRESENT REMARKS THAT ALLIED REPS HAD REALIZED THAT THERE WERE SOME INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR OWN DEFINITION, SO IT FOLLOWED FROM THIS THAT THERE WERE SOME OBJECTIVE FACTS THE ALLIES WERE NOW TAKING INTO ACCOUNT. SECOND, EASTERN REPS HAD BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ALLIED REPS THAT THE EAST WAS FOR REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES IN THE AREA. IN THE REMARKS HE HAD JUST PRESENTED, HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS OF LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE HOW THIS OR THAT TYPE OF PERSONNEL WAS TREATED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00369 08 OF 09 011316Z

44. KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS WERE ACTING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET SHOULD BE SETTLED FIRST. IN THIS SENSE, IT HAD NOT BEEN ENTIRELY CLEAR FROM US REP'S REMARKS WHETHER HE HAD INTENDED TO SAY THAT A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD HELP SOLVE THIS QUESTION AND WHETHER, AFTER SUCH AN EXCHANGE HAD TAKEN PLACE, THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, FOR EXAMPLE THE FRG AND UK, WOULD AGREE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF US REP'S STATEMENT THAT AGREEING ON DATA WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF REDUCTION? AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THE PRINCIPLES OF REDUCTIONS MEANT FIRST, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, AND SECOND, WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED. EASTERN REPS ANTICIPATED THAT THE QUESTION OF DATA WOULD COME UP AT SOME FUTURE STAGE. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY INDICATED TO WESTERN REPS

THAT THE LATTER HAD PROVIDED DATA ONLY ON THE FORCES WHICH THE WEST WISHED TO REDUCE, WITHOUT GIVING FIGURES ON THE OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THAT FACT AND HAD COVERED THAT POINT. SO THAT THESE WERE HIS COMMENTS EXPRESSING THE EASTERN VIEWPOINT AT THE PRESENT STAGE.

45. US REP SAID KHLESTOV HAD JUST SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES SHOULD DEDUCT CZECHOSLOVAK AND POLISH GROUND-BASED DEFENSE FORCES FROM THE FORCE TOTAL. WEST HAD INDEED SUGGESTED EXCLUDING POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL. BUT IT WOULD NOT MAKE ANY SENSE FOR THE WEST TO DEDUCT A SIZEABLE

GROUP OF WARSAW PACT FORCES FROM THE REDUCTION BASE IF THE REDUCTIONS WERE NOT GOING TO FOCUS ON THE FORCES FROM WHICH THEY HAD BEEN DEDUCTED. OTHERWISE, THESE MEN WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE COUNTED IN THE TOTAL FOR REDUCTION.

46. US REP CONTINUED THAT WESTERN REPS THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE OTHER GOOD REASONS FOR DOING WHAT THEY HAD SUGGESTED. THE WESTERN POSITION WAS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE USED TO ELIMINATE THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES. THIS DISPARITY WAS THE MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WEST HAD TOLD EAST WHY WEST OPPOSED INCLUDING AIR

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00369 09 OF 09 011354Z

42

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-08 H-01 INR-05 IO-04

L-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

ACDE-00 /074 W

----- 073477

P 010930Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0567

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 9 OF 9 MBFR VIENNA 0369

FROM US REP MBFR

FORCE IN REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD NOT BE OFFSET IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE AGGREGATE AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON THE TWO SIDES WERE VERY NEARLY EQUAL, THOUGH THE WARSAW

PACT HAD A SLIGHTLY LARGER NUMBER. THIS WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR FOCUSING ON REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES. THAT WAS WHERE THE REAL PROBLEM WAS.

47. US REP SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, EARLIER EASTERN AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS A DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES INDICATED THAT EAST DID NOT CONSIDER DOING SO PREJUDICIAL TO ITS POSITION. WESTERN REPS SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE DISCUSSING A WORKING DEFINITION NOW, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. US REP ADDED THAT, IN ANY EVENT, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GET INTO A
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00369 09 OF 09 011354Z

DISCUSSION OF DATA TO CLEAR UP THOSE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON DATA WHICH APPEAR TO EXIST. US REP NOTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD ASKED WHETHER A DATA DISCUSSION WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. THAT WAS NOT DIRECTLY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WHEN HE SAID THAT AN EXCHANGE OF DATA WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES. THERE WAS AN INTERVENING STEP. IF, ON THE BASIS OF OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE, PARTICIPANTS REACHED AGREEMENT ON NEW TOTALS WHICH INDICATED THAT THE DISPARITY WAS LESS THAN WEST HAD SAID IT WAS, WEST WOULD NOT ASK EAST TO REDUCE MORE THAN WAS NECESSARY TO COME TO AN AGREED COMMON CEILING. THEREFORE, AN EXCHANGE OF DATA MIGHT SMOOTH THE WAY TO AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A FIRST PHASE AND THEN IN TURN ON REDUCTIONS BY OTHERS.

48. KHLESTOV STATED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD LISTENED TO THESE REMARKS WITH CLOSE ATTENTION. HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD CONDUCTED THIS EXCHANGE ON AN INFORMAL BASIS, MERELY IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES. THIS EFFORT TO CLARIFY DID NOT OF ITSELF SIGNIFY EITHER AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT.

49. AS THE SESSION BROKE UP, KHLESTOV SAID THAT THE SESSION HAD BROUGHT LOTS OF FOOD FOR THOUGHT.

50. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT SESSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, AT 10 A.M. THE US WILL BE THE HOST. RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00369
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740313-0100
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741179/aaaacpkf.tel
Line Count: 1350
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 25
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: MBFR VIENNA 0360
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <23 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON OCT 29, 1974
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005